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Introduction
Either explicitly or implicitly, many countries have introduced policies that aim to improve the relative economic, political or social position of disadvantaged groups. Examples include "Affirmative Action" in the United States, "Reservation" in India, "Black Economic Empowerment" in South Africa and "Indigenization" policies across the newly independent states formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union (variously also called "De-Sovietization" or "De-Russification" policies). While the degree, speed, and intensity of indigenization have varied greatly across the post-Soviet states, it usually involved a move away from the Russian language (Pavlenko, 2008) , the reorientation of foreign policy towards the West or more recently towards China (Whitel, McAllister, Light, and Löwenhardt, 2002; İpek, 2007) , and a replacement of ethnic Russian elites by "local" ones (Kuzio, 2002) .
The economic effects of affirmative action or reservation have been extensively studied. In contrast, little is known about the consequences of post-Soviet indigenization policies. We aim to shrink this knowledge gap by examining the differential rates of economic achievement between ethnic Russian and ethnic Kazakh communities in resource-rich Kazakhstan. Following the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan gained independence. Initially struggling, by 2000 it had emerged as a rapidly growing emerging economy. At the same time, an insipid process of Kazakh indigenization (or "Kazakhisation") began to play out, with Kazakhs displacing Russians in the public sector, the armed forces and other key positions. We investigate how the interaction of a dynamic economy and indigenization policies influenced ethnic disparity in Kazakhstan.
We use monthly earnings as our measure of the economic well-being or standard of living. In the empirical analysis, we explain the variations in monthly earnings using labor market and socio-demographic characteristics of individuals as well as other variables commonly found in Mincer-type earnings equation estimations, such as the number of hours of work per week, whether an individual is self-employed or whether he or she works in the public or the private sector. Based on these regression estimates, we decompose the differences in living standards between Kazakhs and Russians in Kazakhstan using Oaxaca-type algorithms to distinguish between the proportion of the earnings gap accounted for by differences in the level of respondents' characteristics (the so-called "characteristics effect") and by differences in the impact on earnings of these characteristics (the "coefficients effect").
The Oaxaca-type algorithms reveal that in 2010 Kazakhs are better endowed with income generating characteristics than Russians. For instance, they are more likely to occupy managerial positions and have tertiary education. Despite these advantages, Kazakhs have lower living standards, on average, than Russians. This is because they receive returns to their characteristics that are not as high as those for Russians and that the coefficients effects dominate the countervailing characteristics effects. Our decompositions leave us with the impression that while "Kazakhisation" might have been successful in a narrow sense -i.e. by empowering Kazakhs to take on leading positions in the public sector -in a broader sense it has turned out to be a self-defeating policy by pushing ethnic Russians into jobs that by 2010 had on average evolved into more productive and at least in monetary terms superior positions than those held by many Kazakhs.
Our paper draws on the relatively small literature on economic interactions between ethnic Russians and ethnic Kazakhs in Kazakhstan. One phenomenon discussed in this literature is the large outward migration of ethnic Russians that Kazakhstan experienced in the 1990s. Becker, Musabek, Seitenova and Urzhumova (2005) , for example, note that emigration of non-Kazakh ethnicities was especially high, and to a large extent influenced by political events that made Russians and other ethnicities feel unwelcome in Kazakhstan. Aldashev and Danzer (forthcoming) investigate the economic returns to bilingualism in Kazakhstan. Rather surprisingly, they find a negative effect of bilingualism on earnings. They rule out the selection of ethnicities into specific sectors as a cause, instead conjecturing that it captures individuals assessing their proficiency in a language relative to their peers and that the apparent wage penalty for bilingualism is in fact a wage penalty for being less fluent in Russian.
More broadly, our paper is also related to the much larger literature on affirmative action in the United States, reservation in India, black economic empowerment in South
Africa and similar policies aimed at improving the relative economic, political or social position of disadvantaged groups. Almost universally, the policies in question tend to be highly controversial -mostly because of issues related to overall fairness and efficiency. At the same time, and in stark contrast to the conclusion of our study, the usual result reported in the empirical literature on the effects of such policies on economic disparities is that in this regard they tend to be rather effective. For instance, with respect to affirmative action policies in the United States, Holzer and Neumark (2005, p. 471) note that "[a]t this point, there seems to be little doubt that racial or gender preferences redistribute certain jobs in the labor market away from white men toward minorities and women". In similar fashion, reservation in India has been shown to increase the access of disadvantaged groups to political decision making (Duflo, 2005) , to raise the number of women who stand for and win elected positions (Beaman, Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Pande and Topalova., 2009 ) and even -under certain circumstances -to significantly reduce poverty (Gang, Sen and Yun, 2008 and Chin and Prakash, 2011) .
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we describe the political and economic situation in Kazakhstan. Section 3 contains a description of the Kazakhstan Migration and Remittances Survey, the data set used henceforth, and a comparison of the mean characteristics of ethnic Russians and Kazakhs. What follows in Section 4 is the main empirical analysis. This consists of two parts: selection-adjusted regressions to analyze the correlates of living standards among Kazakhs and Russians and decompositions of the difference in per-capita earnings between the two ethnic groups based on the methodology developed by Oaxaca (1973) . In Section 5 we examine the robustness of our results and in Section 6 we discuss possible implications for research and policy. The efficiency of the USSR's government in allocating its labor force and restricting the inflow to cities has been questioned. Lewis and Rowland (1979) argue that internal labor migration responded to economic opportunities and was largely unorganized until the mid-1970s. And although the propiska system made it difficult for Soviet citizens to move to preferred cities, these restrictions could be circumvented in a number of ways (cf. Gang and Stuart, 2002 Andrienko and Guriev, 2004, and Danzer, Dietz, Gatskova and Schmillen, 2014) . Since urbanization in Kazakhstan is still ongoing, internal movements have predominantly consisted of population flows from rural to urban areas and from small and medium cities to urban centers. As Dietz, Gatskova and Schmillen (2011) The four cities covered by the KMRS are Almaty (Kazakhstan's largest city and its capital until 1997), Astana (the capital since 1997), Karaganda (once Kazakhstan's second city) and Pavlodar (in the northeastern part of the country).
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In altogether 2227
interviews, respondents -either the head of the household or another "influential"
person in the household -were questioned about demographic and social characteristics of all household members. Together with items on migration and remittances, the core of the questionnaire encompassed questions related to the respondent's current job and employment history.
For each of the four cities, Table 1 In principle, our sample should be representative of the populations of the four
cities. Yet, Table 1 shows that it seems to capture a higher proportion of Russians and a lower proportion of Kazakhs than one would expect from official statistics.
That is why throughout our analysis we use weights reflecting official data on the 
Results
To investigate economic disparities between Kazakhs and Russians in 2010, we employ the regression-based decomposition analysis due to Oaxaca (1973) using the implementation in the Stata ado file oaxaca by Jann (2008) . Initially, we estimate the correlates of log monthly earnings for Kazakhs and Russians. In order to account for possible selection into the labor force, we use a two-stage Heckman selection model (Heckit). Thereafter, we decompose the difference in mean monthly earnings of the two ethnic groups, highlighting the relative roles of differences in characteristics and coefficients in explaining these differences in earnings.
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The explanatory variables in our earnings equations are age, age-squared and gender of the respondent, indicators for whether he or she is the household head and for his or her educational attainment. Additional controls include hours of work per week and dummies for self-employment and employment by a state enterprise. Furthermore, we add controls to account for occupation, sector of employment and the four Kazakh cities where the KMRS was carried out. When estimating the selection equations for labor force participation, we again control for an individuals' socio-demographic characteristics, education and location. In addition to that, family characteristics -an individual's marital status and the proportion of children and seniors in his or her household -are used as instruments. That is, these explanatory variables appear in the selection equation
but not in the earnings equation. This specification borrows significantly from the literature on labor supply and earnings, e.g. from Dimova and Gang (2004) .
Coefficients and robust standard errors of both stages of the Heckit regressions are reported in Table 4 ). Again, this is the case irrespective of whether correlates of log monthly earnings are estimated for Russian or for Kazakh respondents. In spite of some important differences between correlates of log monthly earnings for Russians and Kazakhs, altogether the patterns associated with individual earnings look rather similar for the two groups. Moreover, the direction and size of the individual coefficients are generally what one would expect from the estimation of traditional Mincer-type equations.
We account for possible selection into the labor force. Above we mentioned that the regressions of Table 3 use family characteristics (an individual's marital status and the proportion of children and seniors in the household) as instruments. For Russians, some of these instruments are statistically significant. For instance, respondents in households with a higher proportion of individuals aged five or under or 66 or over tend to be less likely to work. Also for the Russian sample, the inverse Mill's ratio is marginally significant which provides weak evidence that selection into the labor force actually takes place. For Kazakhs, the inverse Mill's ratio is not statistically significant and neither are the instruments.
Though all in all there is only limited evidence that selection into the labor force is indeed an issue we need to worry about, our benchmark decomposition is based on the Heckit estimations of Table 3 . We consider this a precautionary measure. As an alternative, Table 4 shows correlates of log monthly earnings estimated with OLS instead of Heckit. The table demonstrates that at least qualitatively but for the most part also quantitatively earnings equations look very similar using either estimation method.
9 Notes: (1) Share refers to the ratio of the contribution of each factor to the overall differences in monthly earnings of −0.171 log points between Kazakhs and Russians; it is expressed as a percentage of this difference. (2) The symbols * , ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (3) The decomposition is based on the Heckit estimation of Table 3 .
Results from an Oaxaca decomposition based on the selection-corrected estimates from Table 3 are reported in Table 5 .
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The overall (predicted) difference in the logarithm of monthly earnings between Kazakhs and Russians individuals is −0.171.
That is, we need to explain why in 2010 ethnic Russians on average earned 17.1 percent more per month than Kazakhs.
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The overall characteristics and coefficients effects from the decomposition analysis are 0.041 and −0.212 log points, respectively. The positive value of the characteristics effect means that, if Kazakhs and Russians were to have the same regression coefficients, i.e., the impact of the characteristics on their living standards were identical, the logarithm of monthly earnings of Kazakhs would have been higher than that of Russians by 0.041 log points due solely to differences in characteristics. However, the coefficients effect of −0.212 implies that, if both Kazakhs and Russians were to have the same characteristics so that any difference in earnings between the two ethnic groups would be due only to differences in the regression coefficients, e.g., the rates of return on the characteristics, the logarithm of monthly earnings of Kazakhs would have been lower than that of Russians by 0.212 log points. In short, Kazakhs would be worse off if the differences between their characteristics and those of the Russian individuals were to disappear. However, they would be better off in the absence of any differences between the two groups in the effectiveness of, or returns to, those characteristics.
The coefficients effect generally incorporates the effect of the constant term. The coefficients of the constant terms explain the gap between Kazakhs and Russians that is not attributed to controlling or explanatory variables. Hence, the difference in the constant terms may be interpreted as baseline differences between the two ethnic communities. We can separate the effect of the constant term from the effects of the other coefficients by rewriting (1) as:
where is the constant term for group j (A or B ). The result of this partitioning is also reported in Table 5 . Both the characteristics effect and the coefficients effect of the con-trolling or explanatory variables favor the Kazakhs. The latter is not statistically significant, though. The effect of the constant term overwhelmingly favors Russians but is again not statistically significant.
We can decompose the characteristics and the coefficients effects into subgroups of variables or even individual variables. In this context, a critical issue is that the decomposition results for categorical variables depend on which category is chosen to be the omitted base category. To arrive at decomposition results that are independent of such a choice, we make use of a method introduced by Yun (2005) and included in the Stata ado file oaxaca by Jann (2008) . This method relies on first estimating the group models with the standard dummy coding. Next, the coefficient vectors are transformed so that they represent deviations from the grand mean and the coefficient for the base category is added.
As reported in Table 5 , disaggregating the characteristics effect shows that Kazakhs benefit from working more hours per week, from having socio-demographic characteristics more favorable for the labor market (this is for the most part due to the comparatively lower average age of Kazakhs living in Kazakhstan mentioned above), from being more likely to be managers, and from having a generally higher level of education.
On the other hand, Russians have the advantages of being less likely to be employed by state enterprises and of being more likely to reside in a favorable location. As mentioned above, the overall characteristics effect works in the Kazakhs' favor.
Concerning the detailed decomposition of the coefficients effect, much fewer variables are statistically significant. Of those that are, the returns to labor market characteristics favor the Russians while those related to occupations and locations work in the Kazakhs' favor. It should be noted, however, that all these coefficients are significant only at the ten percent level and that, as already mentioned, the overall coefficients effect net of baseline differences between the two ethnic communities is statistically significant not even at this level.
The results reported in Table 5 Notes: (1) Share refers to the ratio of the contribution of each factor to the overall differences in monthly earnings between Kazakhs and Russians; it is expressed as a percentage of this difference. (2) The symbols * , ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Kazakhs to take on leading positions in the public sector -in a broader sense it turned out to be a self-defeating policy because it pushed Russians into jobs that by 2010 had on average evolved into superior positions (at least in monetary terms) than those held by Kazakhs. So far sampling weights have been used throughout the analysis. As mentioned above, these are based on official data on the ethnic composition, age structure and gender ratio in 2010 for the four cities covered by the KMRS (Almaty, Astana, Karaganda and Pavlodar). One concern might be whether such official data can always be seen as reliable. Therefore, sampling weights are removed in the first panel of Kazakh coefficients. This is a standard sensitivity check to test whether results are robust to using the coefficients of one group instead of the other.
Robustness
The different panels of Table 7 make it clear that for all three alternative specifications predicted average monthly earnings are higher for Russians than for
Kazakhs. The magnitude of the difference in these monthly earnings is quite robust as well. Moreover, the signs of aggregate characteristics and coefficients effects stay similar as do those of almost all semi-aggregate variables' effects (or at least of those that are statistically significant). What does vary somewhat is the exact magnitude and level of statistical significance of some variables' characteristics and coefficient effects. Notes: (1) Share refers to the ratio of the contribution of each factor to the overall differences in monthly earnings between Kazakhs and Russians; it is expressed as a percentage of this difference. (2) The symbols * , ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. We explained this apparent puzzle using Oaxaca type decompositions. These showed that while in 2010 Kazakhs were better endowed with income generating characteristics (e.g. they benefited from being more likely to be managers and to have tertiary education) but received returns to these characteristics that were not as high as those of Russians (both overall and with respect to specific characteristics such as those related to the labor market and certain sectors). In the aggregate, the coefficients effect dominated and Kazakhs had comparatively lower average earnings. Our decompositions left us with the impression that while "Kazakhisation" might have been successful in a narrow sense -e.g. by empowering Kazakhs to take on leading positions in the public sectorin a broader sense it has turned out to be a self-defeating policy by pushing ethnic Russians into jobs that by 2010 had on average evolved into superior positions -at least in monetary terms -than those held by Kazakhs.
Conclusions
Our result of a self-defeating indigenization strategy is in stark contrast to the conclusions reached by much of the empirical literature on the effects of policies aimed at improving the situation of disadvantaged groups which usually finds these policies to be rather effective. Moreover, it appears almost ironic that Kazakhs, i.e. those individuals belonging to the ethnicity that dominates Kazakhstan and forms its titular nation, tend to have more favorable characteristics than Russians but still earn less.
